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Abstract. Markets for zero-day exploits (software vulnerabilities un-
known to the vendor) have a long history and a growing popularity.
We study these markets from a revenue-maximizing mechanism design
perspective. We first propose a theoretical model for zero-day exploits
markets. In our model, one exploit is being sold to multiple buyers. There
are two kinds of buyers, which we call the defenders and the offenders.
The defenders are buyers who buy vulnerabilities in order to fix them
(e.g., software vendors). The offenders, on the other hand, are buyers
who intend to utilize the exploits (e.g., national security agencies and
police). Our model is more than a single-item auction. First, an exploit
is a piece of information, so one exploit can be sold to multiple buyers.
Second, buyers have externalities. If one defender wins, then the exploit
becomes worthless to the offenders. Third, if we disclose the details of the
exploit to the buyers before the auction, then they may leave with the
information without paying. On the other hand, if we do not disclose the
details, then it is difficult for the buyers to come up with their private
valuations. Considering the above, our proposed mechanism discloses the
details of the exploit to all offenders before the auction. The offenders
then pay to delay the exploit being disclosed to the defenders.
Keywords: Revenue Maximization · Mechanism Design · Security Economics ·
Bug Bounty
1 Introduction
A zero-day exploit refers to a software vulnerability that has not been disclosed
to the public, and is unknown to the software vendor. Information of new vulner-
abilities gives cyber attackers free passes to attacking targets, while the vulner-
abilities remain undetected. The trading of zero-day exploits has a long history,
and selling them by security researchers as “legitimate source of income” is a
recent trend [5].
Zero-day exploits markets are not necessarily black markets where the buy-
ers are potential cyber criminals. Software vendors buy exploits via bug bounty
reward programs. National security agencies and police also buy exploits. It is
widely reported that government agencies utilize zero-day exploits to track crim-
inals or for other national security reasons. Financial industry companies buy
exploits to prevent attacks (once an exploit method is known, these companies
can then carry out counter measures to prevent attacks). There are legitimate
venture capital backed security companies whose business model is to sell ex-
ploits for profit. For example, ZeroDium is a zero-day acquisition firm, which
buys high-risk vulnerabilities with premium rewards, then resells them to mostly
government clients [6]. Another similar company is Vupen, who offers a subscrip-
tion service for its clients, providing vulnerability data and exploits for zero days
and other bugs [6].
Greenberg presented a price list of zero-day exploit sale, ranging from $5,000-
$30,000 to $100,000-$250,000 [8]. These prices are so high because it is gener-
ally difficult for the software vendor to independently discover these vulnerabil-
ities [2], hence the exploits are expected to be alive for long periods of time.
In this paper, we study markets for zero-day exploits from a revenue-maximizing
mechanism design perspective. Our contributions are:
– We present a theoretical mechanism design model for zero-day exploits mar-
kets. We identify the unique features of zero-day exploits markets. First, an
exploit is a piece of information, so one exploit can be sold to multiple buy-
ers. Second, buyers have externalities. We divide the buyers into two types:
the offenders and the defenders. Once a defender “wins” an exploit, the ex-
ploit becomes worthless for the offenders. Third, if we disclose the details
of the exploit to the buyers before the auction, then they may leave with
the information without paying. On the other hand, if we do not disclose
the details, then it is difficult for the buyers to come up with their private
valuations.
– We propose the straight-forward (SF) mechanism property, which requires
that the mechanism discloses the full details of the exploit to the offenders
before they submit their bids. In Proposition 1, we show that for the purpose
of designing revenue-maximizing mechanisms, if SP, IR, and SF are required,
then it is without loss of generality to focus on mechanisms that “divide”
the time frame into two regions. Such a mechanism would disclose the full
details of the exploit to all offenders, and then based on the reports from
both the offenders and the defenders, pick an ending time. Before the ending
time, the exploit is alive. Once it reaches the ending time, the exploit is
revealed to the defenders, which renders it worthless. The offenders bid to
keep the exploit alive, while the defenders bid to close the exploit earlier.
Our model is similar to both the cake-cutting problem [3,4] and the single
facility location problem [7,13].
– For a simplified single-parameter model, where every agent’s type is charac-
terized by a single parameter instead of a valuation function over time. We
modify and apply Myerson’s classic technique for designing optimal single-
item auction [12] to our problem of dividing a continuous region. We derive
an optimal mechanism that maximizes the expected revenue for the single-
parameter model.
– For the general model, we adopt the computationally feasible automated
mechanism design approach [9]: instead of optimizing over all mechanisms,
we focus on a family of parameterized mechanisms, and tune the parame-
ters in order to obtain a good mechanism. We focus on the AMA mecha-
nisms used for designing revenue-maximizing combinatorial auctions [10,11].
To identify a good AMA mechanism, we propose a technique that com-
bines both optimization and heuristics. We show via numerical experiments
that our technique produces good revenue expectation: when applied to a
single-parameter model (our technique does not require the single-parameter
model), our technique achieves nearly 80% of the optimal revenue (one rea-
son we test our technique in a single-parameter model is that we are able to
calculate the optimal revenue for comparison).
2 Model Description
In this section, we present our mechanism design model for zero-day exploits
markets. Our aim is to create a model with minimal assumptions, and draw a
parallel between our model and existing classic mechanism design models.
There is one exploit being sold to multiple game-theoretically strategic buy-
ers. The seller is also the mechanism designer, who wants to maximize her rev-
enue (e.g., the seller is a security company that sells exploits for profit3).
Assumption 1. The set of all buyers consists of two types of buyers: the de-
fenders and the offenders.
– A defender is a buyer who buys exploits in order to fix them. Given a specific
exploit, usually there is only one defender. For example, suppose the exploit
attacks the Chrome browser, then Google is the defender, who would, for
example, buy the exploit via its bug bounty reward program. Our model
allows multiple defenders, but we assume that as soon as one defender gets
hold of an exploit, the exploit gets immediately fixed, therefore rendering
3 Example such companies include ZeroDium and Vupen [6].
it worthless. That is, if one defender receives information about an exploit,
then all defenders benefit from it.
– An offender is a buyer who intends to utilize the exploit.
Based on the above assumption, we cannot sell an exploit to an offensive
buyer after we sell it to any defensive buyer.
Assumption 2. One exploit is sold over a time frame [0, 1]. 0 represents the
moment the exploit is ready for sale. 1 represents the exploit’s end of life (e.g., it
could be the end of life of the affected software, or the release of a major service
pack).
A mechanism outcome is represented by (t1, t2, . . . , tn), where ti is the mo-
ment the exploit is disclosed to buyer i. We assume that all defenders receive
the information at the same time, denoted by tend (if one defender receives the
information, then the exploit is fixed right away). It is also without loss of gen-
erality to assume that if i is an offensive buyer, then ti ∈ [0, tend] (receiving the
information after tend is equivalent to receiving it exactly at tend – from this
point on, the exploit is worthless).
Buyer i’s type is characterized by a nonnegative function vi(t). If i is an
offensive buyer who receives the exploit at ti and the exploit gets fixed at tend,
then i’s valuation equals
∫ tend
ti
vi(t)dt. Similarly, if i is a defensive buyer, then
her valuation equals
∫ 1
tend
vi(t)dt. Basically, the offenders wish to keep the exploit
alive for as long as possible, while the defenders wish to fix the exploit as early
as possible.
A mechanism takes as input the valuation functions (vi(t) for i = 1, 2, . . . , n),
and produces an outcome (t1, t2, . . . , tn) and a payment vector (p1, p2, . . . , pn),
where pi is the amount i pays under the mechanism. A buyer’s utility equals her
valuation minus her payment. We focus on mechanisms that are strategy-proof
and individually rational.
Definition 1. Strategy-proof (SP): For every buyer i, by reporting vi(t) truth-
fully, her utility is maximized.
Definition 2. Individually rational (IR): For every buyer i, by reporting vi(t)
truthfully, her utility is nonnegative.
Besides SP and IR, we introduce another mechanism property specifically for
zero-day exploits markets.
One thing we have been ignoring is that an exploit is a piece of information.
As a result, if we disclose the exploit’s details to the buyers beforehand, then
they may simply walk away with the information for free. If we do not describe
what we are selling, then it is difficult for the buyers to come up with their
valuation functions.
Assumption 3. We assume that there are two ways for the seller to describe
an exploit: either describe the full details, or describe what can be achieved with
the exploit (e.g., with this exploit, anyone can seize full control of a Windows 7
system remotely).
– We assume that it is safe for the seller to disclose what can be achieved with
the exploit. That is, the buyers will not be able to derive “how it is done”
from “what can be achieved”.
– If the seller only discloses what can be achieved, then it is difficult for an
offensive buyer to determine whether the exploit is new, or something she
already knows. It is therefore difficult for the offensive players to come up
with their valuation functions in this kind of situation. They may come up
with expected valuation functions (by estimating how likely the exploit is
new), but this may then lead to regret after the auction.
– We assume that the defenders are able to come up with private valuation
functions just based on what can be achieved. This is because all zero-day
exploits are by definition unknown to the defenders. This assumption is con-
sistent with practise. For bug bounty programs, vulnerabilities are generally
classified into different levels of severities, and vendors pay depending on
these classification [1]. For example, Google Chrome provides guidelines to
classify vulnerabilities into critical, high, medium, and low severities, and
pay accordingly [14].
The above assumptions lead to the following mechanism property:
Definition 3. Straight-forward (SF): A mechanism is straight-forward if the
mechanism reveals the full details of the exploit to the offensive buyers, before
asking for their valuation functions.
It should be noted that SF does not require that the exploit details be re-
vealed to the defenders before they bid. If the seller does this, then the defenders
would simply fix the exploit and bid vi(t) ≡ 0. Due to IR, the defenders can get
away without paying.
Offenders are revealed the details before they bid, but they cannot simply
bid vi(t) ≡ 0 to get away without paying. Our mechanisms’ key idea is to use the
defenders as “threat”. That is, if the offenders bid too low, then we disclose the
exploit to the defenders earlier, which renders the exploit worthless. Essentially,
the offenders need to pay to keep the exploit alive (the more they pay, the longer
the exploit remains alive).
From now on, we focus on mechanisms that are SP, SF, and IR. We present
the following characterization result:
Proposition 1. Let M be a mechanism that is strategy-proof, individually ra-
tional, and straight-forward.
We can easily construct M ′ based on M , so that M ′ is also strategy-proof,
individually rational, and straight-forward. M ′ and M have the same revenue
for all type profiles. M ′ takes the following form:
– At time 0, the seller reveals the exploit in full details to all offenders, and
reveals what can be achieved with the exploit to all defenders.
– Collect valuation functions from the buyers.
– Pick an outcome and a payment vector based on the reports. It should be
noted that it is sufficient to represent the outcome using just tend, which is
when the exploit gets fixed.
The above proposition implies that for the purpose of design revenue-maximizing
mechanisms, it is without loss of generality to focus on mechanisms with the
above form.
Proof. Given M , we modify it and construct M ′ as follows: for all i that is an
offender, we move ti to 0. For all i that is a defender, we do not change ti.
For every type profile, we keep M ’s payment vector. That is, M ′ has the same
revenue for every type profile. M ′ is obviously SF.
Now we show M ′ is still SP and IR. It is easy to see that the defenders’
valuations are not changed, so M ′ is still SP and IR for the defenders. Offend-
ers’ valuations are changed. For offender i, originally under M , she receives the
information at time ti. Under M
′, she receives the information at time 0. It
should be noted that because M is SF, that means ti is not dependent on i’s
own report. Therefore, the valuation increase for i, which equals
∫ ti
0 vi(t)dt, is
independent of i’s own report. Hence, this increase of valuation does not change
i’s strategy. M ′ is still SP and IR for the offenders as well.
3 Comparing Against Classic Models
To summarize our model, there are two types of agents (offenders and defenders).
Agent i’s type is characterized by her valuation function vi(t). The outcome
tend(v1, v2, . . . , vn) ∈ [0, 1] is chosen based on the type profile. The exploit is
active between [0, tend], during which period all offenders can utilize the exploit.
The exploit becomes worthless from tend. High bids (high valuation functions)
from the offenders would push tend toward 1, while high bids from the defenders
would push tend toward 0.
Our model is very similar to both the cake-cutting problem and the single
facility location problem.
Cake-cutting: The time frame [0, 1] can be viewed as the cake. tend cuts
the cake into two halves. The agents’ types are also characterized by valuation
functions instead of single values. On the other hand, there are also differences.
For one thing, our model is more like group cake cutting, as both sides involve
multiple agents. Secondly, the offenders are bound to the left-hand side ([0, tend])
while the defenders are bound to the right-hand side ([tend, 1]).
Single facility location: tend can also be viewed as the position of the facility
in a single facility location problem. The defenders are all positioned at 0, so they
prefer tend to be closer to 0 (which enlarges the interval [tend, 1]). The offenders
are all positioned at 1, so they prefer tend to be closer to 1 (which enlarges the
interval [0, tend]).
Unfortunately, most cake-cutting and facility location literatures focus on
money-free settings, so previous results do not apply to our problem of revenue
maximizing mechanism design.
4 Optimal Single-Parameter Mechanism
In this section, we study a simplified single-parameter model, and derive an opti-
mal mechanism that maximizes the expected revenue. Results in this section are
based on Myerson’s technique on optimal single item auction, which is modified
to work for our problem.
Assumption 4. Single-parameter model (we need this assumption only in this
section): Agent i’s valuation function vi(t) is characterized by a single parameter
θi ∈ [0,∞):
vi(t) = θici(t)
Here, ci(t) is a publicly known nonnegative function. That is, i’s type is charac-
terized by a single parameter θi.
For example, consider an offender i, if ci(t) represents the number of users i
may attack using the exploit at time t, and θi is agent i’s valuation for attacking
one user over one unit of time, then we have vi(t) = θici(t). (For defenders, it’d
be saving instead of attacking.)
For the single-parameter model, a mechanism is characterized by functions
tend and p. tend(θ1, θ2, . . . , θn) determines the outcome. p(θ1, θ2, . . . , θn) deter-
mines the payment vector. Actually, for mechanisms that are SP and IR, p is
completely determined by the allocation function tend.
Fixing θ−i and drop it from the notation, when agent i reports θi, we denote
the outcome by tend(θi).
Proposition 2. If i is an offender, then we define
xi(θi) =
∫ tend(θi)
0
ci(t)dt
If i is a defender, then we define
xi(θi) =
∫ 1
tend(θi)
ci(t)dt
A mechanism is SP and IR if and only if for all i, xi(θi) is nondecreasing in
θi, and agent i’s payment equals exactly
θixi(θi)−
∫ θi
0
xi(z)dz
Proof. Suppose xi(θi) is nondecreasing in θi and i pays according to the above
expression. By reporting θi, i’s utility equals
θixi(θi)− θixi(θi) +
∫ θi
0
xi(z)dz =
∫ θi
0
xi(z)dz ≥ 0.
The above implies IR. We then show SP. By reporting θ′i, i’s utility equals
θixi(θ
′
i)− θ
′
ixi(θ
′
i) +
∫ θ′
i
0
xi(z)dz.
We subtract the above from i’s utility when reporting truthfully, the difference
equals ∫ θi
0
xi(z)dz − θixi(θ
′
i) + θ
′
ixi(θ
′
i)−
∫ θ′
i
0
xi(z)dz.
If θi > θ
′
i, then the above equals∫ θi
θ′
i
xi(z)dz − (θi − θ
′
i)xi(θ
′
i) ≥
∫ θi
θ′
i
xi(θ
′
i)dz − (θi − θ
′
i)xi(θ
′
i)
The right-hand side equals 0. Hence, under-reporting is never beneficial. Simi-
larly, we can show over-reporting is never beneficial.
For the other direction, suppose the mechanism under discussion is SP and
IR. We use pi(θi) to represent i’s payment. By SP, we have
θixi(θi)− pi(θi) ≥ θixi(θ
′
i)− pi(θ
′
i)
θ′ixi(θ
′
i)− pi(θ
′
i) ≥ θ
′
ixi(θi)− pi(θi)
Combining these two inequalities, we get
(θi − θ
′
i)xi(θi) ≥ (θi − θ
′
i)xi(θ
′
i).
Therefore, xi must be nondecreasing.
By reporting θ′i, i’s utility equals θixi(θ
′
i) − pi(θ
′
i). This is maximized when
θ′i = θi. Also, θi is arbitrary. We have zx
′
i(z) = p
′
i(z). Integrating both sides from
0 to θi, we get that i’s payment must be as described in the proposition.
For agent i, we assume θi is drawn independently from 0 to an upper bound
Hi, according to a probability density function fi (and cumulative density func-
tion Fi). Agent i’s virtual valuation φi(θi) is defined as
φi(θi) = θi −
1− Fi(θi)
fi(θi)
We need the monotone hazard rate condition: the virtual valuation functions are
nondecreasing (which is generally true for common distributions).
Given the payment characterization result, the expected payment from agent
i equals Eθi(φi(θi)xi(θi)). That is, given a type profile, to maximize revenue, we
pick tend to maximize
∑
i(φi(θi)xi(θi)). This decides how to pick the outcome.
The last step is a new step on top of Myerson’s technique, which is required for
our problem. For our model, xi is not necessarily bounded between 0 and 1 (for
single-item auction, the proportion won by an agent is between 0 and 1). Also,
the sum of the xi is not necessarily bounded above by 1 (for single-item auction,
the total proportion allocated is at most 1). Without these bounds, picking the xi
becomes more difficult. Fortunately, for our model, an outcome is characterized
by a single value, so we simply run a single dimensional optimization. It should be
noted that when an agent increases her bid, her virtual valuation also increases
according to the monotone hazard rate condition. This leads to higher value for
xi under our model. That is, the above rule for picking an outcome ensures that
the xi are monotone.
The payments are then calculated according to the payment characterization
result. The resulting mechanism maximizes the expected revenue.
5 General Model and Randomized Mechanisms
In this section, we return to the original model where an agent’s type is charac-
terized by a valuation function instead of a single parameter.
To design revenue-maximizing mechanisms for the general model, we adopt
the computationally feasible automated mechanism design approach [9]. That
is, instead of optimizing over all mechanisms (which is too difficult), we focus
on a family of parameterized mechanisms, and tune the parameters in order to
obtain a good mechanism. We focus on the AMA mechanisms used for designing
revenue-maximizing combinatorial auctions [10,11]. To identify an AMA mecha-
nism with high revenue, we propose a technique that combines both optimization
and heuristic methods.
The family of AMA mechanisms includes the VCG mechanism as a special
case. For our model, the VCG mechanism works as follows:
– Pick an outcome t∗end, which maximizes the agents’ total valuation. We de-
note the set of offenders by O and the set of defenders by D. For an offender
i ∈ O, her valuation for outcome t equals Vi(t) =
∫ t
0
vi(z)dz. For a defender
i ∈ D, her valuation for outcome t equals Vi(t) =
∫ 1
t
vi(z)dz.
t∗end = arg max
t∈[0,1]
{
∑
i
Vi(t)}
– Then agent i pays how much her presence hurts the other agents. That is,
agent i pays
max
t∈[0,1]
{
∑
j 6=i
Vj(t)} −
∑
j 6=i
Vj(t
∗
end)
The AMA mechanisms generalize the VCG mechanisms by assigning a posi-
tive coefficient µi to each agent. The AMA mechanisms also assign an “adjust-
ment term” λ(o) for each outcome o, where λ can be any arbitrary function. For
our model, the AMA mechanisms work as follows (different µi and λ correspond
to different AMA mechanisms):
– Pick an outcome t∗end, which maximizes the agents’ total valuation, consid-
ering the µi and the function λ.
t∗end = arg max
t∈[0,1]
{
∑
i
µiVi(t) + λ(t)}
– Then agent i pays how much her presence hurts the other agents, again,
considering the µi and the function λ. Agent i pays
1
µi

max
t∈[0,1]
{
∑
j 6=i
µjVj(t) + λ(t)} −
∑
j 6=i
µjVj(t
∗
end)− λ(t
∗
end)


The idea behind the AMA mechanisms is that by assigning larger coefficients
to the weaker agents (agents who most likely lose according to the prior distribu-
tion), it increases competition, therefore increases revenue. Also, if an outcome
o is frequently chosen and the agents have high surplus on this outcome, then
by assigning a negative λ(o), the agents may be forced to pay more for this
outcome.
All AMA mechanisms are SP and IR. Since we disclose the full details of the
exploit to all offenders in the beginning, SF is always guaranteed.
So far, we have only considered deterministic mechanisms. t∗end refers to a
particular moment. Between [0, tend], the exploit is 100% alive, while between
[tend, 1], the exploit is 100% dead (already fixed). We could generalize the out-
come space by allowing randomized mechanisms. A randomized mechanism’s
outcome is not just a single value. Instead, the outcome is characterized by a
function α(t) over time. For any moment t, α(t) represents the probability that
the exploit is still alive at this moment. α’s values must be between 0 and 1,
and it needs to nonincreasing. The new outcome space includes all deterministic
outcomes. For example, the deterministic outcome t∗end is simply
α(t) =
{
1, t ≤ t∗end
0, t > t∗end
Allowing randomized mechanisms potentially increases the optimal expected
revenue. For example, if one offender has extremely high valuation with very low
probability, then under a randomized mechanism, the mechanism could threat
to disclose the exploit with a low probability (say, 1%), unless the agent pays a
buck load of money. If the agent doesn’t have high valuation, which is most of
the time, then she wouldn’t pay. Since the seller is only disclosing the exploit
with 1% probability, this does not change the expected revenue too much. But
if the agent does have high valuation, then the mechanism could earn way more
from this agent.
A valid outcome function maps the time frame [0, 1] to values between 1 and
0, and are nonincreasing. Let A be the outcome space. It should be noted that
A does not have to contain all valid outcome functions. Allowing randomization,
the AMA mechanisms have the following form:
– Pick an outcome function α ∈ A, which maximizes the agents’ total valua-
tion, considering the µi and the function λ.
For an offender i ∈ O, her valuation for outcome function α equals Vi(α) =∫ 1
0
α(z)vi(z)dz.
For a defender i ∈ D, her valuation for outcome function α equals Vi(α) =∫ 1
0
(1− α(z))vi(z)dz.
α∗ = argmax
α∈A
{
∑
i
µiVi(α) + λ(α)}
– Then agent i pays how much her presence hurts the other agents, again,
considering the µi and the function λ. Agent i pays
1
µi

max
α∈A
{
∑
j 6=i
µjVj(α) + λ(α)} −
∑
j 6=i
µjVj(α
∗)− λ(α∗)


We need to pick the µi and λ that correspond to high expected revenue. It
is infeasible to numerically try all µi values and all λ functions. As a result, we
adopt a heuristic method for picking the µi and λ.
First, we restrict the outcome space A to functions of the following form:
α(t) =
{
β1, t ≤ β2
0, t > β2
Here, both β1 and β2 are values between 0 and 1. All functions in A are charac-
terized by these two parameters. We denote the outcome function characterized
by β1 and β2 by αβ1,β2 . The idea is that instead of making the exploit 100%
alive from the beginning, we may simply kill the exploit right from the beginning
with probability (1− β1).
We choose the following λ, where ζ is a parameter of the mechanism:
λ(αβ1,β2) = ζ(1 − β1) ∗ β2
What we are doing is that we reward outcomes that kill the exploit (with
high probabilities) right from the beginning (making these outcomes easier to
get chosen under AMA). As a result, if the offenders would like to keep the
exploit alive with high probability from the beginning, they have to pay more.
Previously, for deterministic mechanisms, the exploit is alive 100% from the
beginning. After the adjustments here, the agents need to pay to achieve high
probability from the beginning.
Once we focus our attention on λ of the above form. An AMA mechanism
is characterized by n parameters: the µi (except for µ1, since it is without loss
of generality to set µ1 = 1) and ζ. For small number of agents, we are able
to numerically optimize over these parameters and obtain an AMA mechanism
with good expected revenue.
6 Example and Simulation
In this section, we present an example mechanism design scenario, and simulate
our proposed mechanisms’ performances.
To make the examples more accessible, we consider a simple single-parameter
setting involving just one offender (agent 1) and one defender (agent 2).
For single-parameter settings, an agent’s valuation function vi(t) equals θici(t),
where ci(t) describes the pattern of this agent’s valuation over time. For the of-
fender, we assume c1(t) = 1 − t. That is, the offender has higher valuation for
the exploit earlier on, and her valuation drops to 0 at the end of the time frame.
For the defender, we assume c2(t) = 1. That is, the defender’s valuation for the
exploit does not change over time.
In order to make our example and simulation more realistic, we assume
the exploit is a vulnerability of the Chrome browser. According to [8], an ex-
ploit that attacks the Chrome browser sells between 80k and 200k for offensive
clients (USD). According to Google’s official bug bounty reward program for the
Chrome browser [14], a serious exploit is priced between 0.5k and 15k. That is,
for a defender, we expect the total valuation to be from this range.
The valuation of agent 1 (the offender) for the exploit for the whole time
frame equals θ1
∫ 1
0
(1 − t)dt = θ1/2. So we assume θ1 is drawn from a uniform
distribution U(160, 400). The valuation of agent 2 (the defender) for the exploit
for the whole time frame equals θ2
∫ 1
0 1dt = θ2. So we assume θ2 is drawn from
a uniform distribution U(0.5, 15).
Optimal single-parameter mechanism: Agent 1’s virtual valuation equals
φ1(θ1) = θ1 −
1− θ1−160240
1/240
= 2θ1 − 400
Agent 2’s virtual valuation equals Similarly, agent 2’s virtual valuation equals
φ2(θ2) = 2θ2 − 15. Both are monotone as required.
Given a type profile, to maximize revenue, we pick tend to maximize∑
i
(φi(θi)xi(θi)),
where x1(θ1) =
∫ tend
0 (1 − t)dt = tend −
t2
end
2 and x2(θ2) =
∫ 1
tend
dt = 1 − tend.
That is, we pick tend to maximize
(2θ1 − 400)(tend −
t2end
2
) + (2θ2 − 15)(1− tend)
For example, if θ1 = 300 and θ2 = 10, tend = 0.975.
Based on the payment characterization result, agent 1 pays 102.4 and agent
2 pays 0.2188. Considering all type profiles, the expected total revenue equals
79.20.
AMA mechanism: As mentioned earlier, we focus on AMA mechanisms that
are characterized by 2 parameters: µ2 and ζ. For each pair of parameters, we
can simulate the expected revenue. After optimization, we choose µ2 = 13 and
ζ = 31. For this pair, the expected revenue is 63.53. This value is nearly 80% of
the optimal revenue (79.20). Also, we cannot achieve such good result without
the heuristic term. If we set ζ = 0, then the obtained revenue is 52.63. We be-
lieve this example demonstrates the usefulness of our AMA and heuristic-based
technique.
VCG mechanism: The VCG mechanism is the AMA mechanism with µ2 = 1
and ζ = 0. Under VCG, the expected revenue is merely 7.667.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we study markets for zero-day exploits from a revenue-maximizing
mechanism design perspective. We proposed a theoretical mechanism design
model for zero-day exploits markets. By requiring a new mechanism property
called straight-forwardness, we also showed that for the purpose of designing
revenue-maximizing mechanisms, it is without loss of generality to focus on
mechanisms that “divide” the time frame into two regions, which makes our
model similar to both the cake-cutting problem and the single facility location
problem.
We first considered a simplified single-parameter model, where every agent’s
type is characterized by a single parameter. With necessary modification and
extension at the last step, we were able to apply Myerson’s classic technique
for designing optimal single-item auction to our model and derived the optimal
mechanism for single-parameter models.
For the general model, we adopted the computationally feasible automated
mechanism design approach. We focused on the AMA mechanisms. To identify
an AMA mechanism with high revenue, we proposed a technique that combines
both optimization and heuristics. Numerical experiments demonstrated that our
AMA and heuristic-based technique performs well.
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